History – Christopher Wink

What Baltimore’s “Black Butterfly“ teaches the rest of us

Why does there remain a plethora of social ills the disproportionally affect Black people in America over 150 years after chattel enslavement has ended? “The answer: black communities have been subjected to unrelenting an ongoing historical trauma.“

That’s from The Black Butterfly: The Harmful Politics of Race and Space in America by Dr. Lawrence T Brown in 2021. He coined the term “black butterfly” to refer to the patterns of racial segregation in Baltimore, which mirrors patterns in other US cities.

Below I share my notes for future reference.

The Rise and Decline of Nations

Coalitions strengthen a nation, and then strangle it whole.

Or so it’s been argued. In his influential 1982 political treatise called The Rise and Decline of Nations, political scientist Mancur Olson (1932-1998) builds on his earlier work on collective action to argue that stable societies tend to accumulate powerful special-interest groups over time, which in turn create institutional sclerosis.

These groups—unions, industry associations and other lobbying blocs—develop to protect their members’ economic rents, but their growing influence eventually stifles innovation, efficiency and long-term economic growth. Olson argues that this “accumulation of distributional coalitions” explains why some rich nations stagnate while others surge ahead. Post-war Germany and Japan, having lost these entrenched coalitions due to military defeat, grew rapidly in contrast to countries like the UK or the US, which retained their institutional inertia. I share notes from the book below.

What is Fascism?

In 1946, George Orwell wrote that “the word fascism has now no meaning except in so far as it signifies something not desirable.”

That sense is back, and since the word is used so often again, I wanted to return to a foundation. I didn’t have clear memories from my undergraduate political science reading so I picked up Fascism, an influential, well-regarded, thick, dense, 400+ page collection of writings on the topic published in 1995 and edited by Oxford political theorist Roger Griffin.

It was a slog but a firm foundation, in which the point is argued that the word was almost immediately stretched and packed with various meanings from its modern launch in the 1920s. In the simplest interpretation I can put together, fascism is a political strategy “idealizing abstraction” that uses power to protect a “mythic core” of kinship around a nation from out-groups.

Judging by the 400-page book, and oodles of dissertations and academic writing, that’s of course incomplete. I have more listed below for that matter. But it does arm me with a clearer picture, grounded in academia and without cartoonish exaggeration. Below I have other notes from the book for future reference.

The Message by Ta Nehisi Coates

Every story is imbued with the biographies of those who hear and repeat it. And so each story gets distorted some. We can lose the author’s original intent.

It’s fitting then that I came to assume that Ta-Nehisi Coates’s new collection of essays published in the fall — one year after the Hamas attack on Israel — was exclusively about the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Notably including a CBS Morning interview, what I heard about the book was centered on the conflict.

Instead “The Message” is a curated archive of private reflections and political commentary informed by short trips Coates took to several locations to reflect on race, justice and U.S. foreign policy. Just the final chapter features a few days he spent in Israel and Palestine. The book’s overall message is less about any single conflict and more what he describes as a moral responsibility of the writer to speak plainly in moments of great public consequence.

Below my notes.

How to hide an empire

In 1916, the United Kingdom and the United States both formally commemorated new holidays. The British crown introduced Empire Day; For the Americans, it was Flag Day.

That distinction between the reigning world superpower and its quickly rising successor says a lot. Once, empire was a point of pride, a signal of strength and responsibility, but as the United States established itself as the global leader, that changed. In 1940, 1 in 3 people in the world lived in a self-described empire. By 1965, that total was 1 in 50, and falling. Though the United States hasn’t used the term, a growing body of research argues historians should.

That’s from “How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States,” a 2019 book written by historian Daniel Immerwahr. It is a kind of global version of the influential “A People’s History of the United States,” Howard Zinn’s classic from 1980 that was updated in 2003 (the version I read as an undergrad).

Immerwahr argues the American empire looks different, based less on large swaths of land and more on strategic ports. This was made easier still as American science introduced a growing number of synthetic replacements for physical goods, such as synthetic fertilizers and rubber replacements (The United States “replaced colonies with chemistry”). Nonetheless, that American flag waved over a growing number of points in the world — with similar problems that are familiar to any previous empire.

American leaders faced a “trilemma,” as Immerwahr puts it. They’ve had to choose between Republicanism, overseas expansion and white supremacy, but can only achieve two. Rather than drop white supremacy, the United States cut the Republicanism, thereby overseeing the Philippines in the past and currently maintaining Puerto Rico, Guam the US Virgin Islands and other inconsistently administered territories without full nationhood. The book is challenging and worth grappling with, regardless of your own take on it all. I recommend it.

Below my notes for future reference.

The world history of the horse

The great manure crisis of 1894 has become a half-joking reference to the very serious public health challenge that big cities around the world faced near the end of the 19th century.

A growing reliance on horse power meant the smell, disease and discomfort of manure that wasn’t being removed fast enough. Exactly because this feels so archaic a problem neatly conveys how much we relied on horses, and then how dramatically we replaced them with mechanical labor. Yet the love persists.

This is from Timothy Winegard’s summer 2024 book The Horse: A Galloping History of Humanity. It’s thicker, denser and at at times more lyrical than I expected. It’s certainly a new approach to the sweep of history. Below I share my notes for future reference.

Why has war lasted for thousands of years?

The first recorded war involved the Sumerians in Mesopotamia almost 5,000 years ago. Prehistoric war is thought to be far older. Can we ever get rid of it?

Margaret Mead said war is older than the jury system but no less an invention to address conflict, and so it can be removed. As the anthropologist Douglas Fry more recently wrote: “War like slavery before it can be abolished.”

Whether peace or war is the more natural human state is disputed and complicated.

That’s from the 2024 book Why War?, which recasts an old question that previous literature has addressed, this time from British historian Richard Overy. The book is largely a review of the literature on war. All the disciplines in these chapters build on each other, starting in evolution, biologically evolved to demonstrated aggression.

“Warfare,” Overy wrote “ is not in our genes, but for our genes.” There is still a role for historians (and therefore journalists) to interpret the specific human actions of “why THIS war” but there is also a broad universal answer to the question Why War: It’s been an effective means to resolve dispute, despite considerable cost, so war emerged from our systems by hijacking our instincts.

Or as the author himself concludes: “The co-evolution of culture and biology for most of the long human past created conditions within which nature and nurture together, not either one or the other, reinforced the resort to violence when regarded as necessary or advantageous.”

Below I share my notes for future reference.

How Rome fell

Leaders of the late Roman Empire faced at least as many threats from within as without. Over-extension, declining trust in its institutions, falling middle class and a series of ineffective leaders that failed to address these looming threats all contributed to the decline of antiquity’s greatest force.

That’s the theme from “Home Rome Fell,” published in 2010 by British historian Adrian Goldsworthy. I picked it up for my own sense of every amateur historian’s favorite period.

Over nearly 500 pages, the book adds considerable depth to the simple tables we learn in high school. Speaking of which, I recreated one of those over-simplified tables below, heh.

753 BCE: Rome is established	509 BCE: Roman Republic established	27 BCE: Octavian made first Roman emperor	476 CE: Germans depose last Roman emperor	1453: Ottoman Empire overthrows Constantinople
Rome’s Period of Kings (244 years)	Roman Republic (482 years)	Roman Empire (503 years)	Byzantine Empire (977 years)

Below are my notes for future reference.

The Creative Spark of humanity

Hominins are a bush of species millions of years old, not one line leading to homo sapiens. Even if we’re the last standing. Our defining characteristic is coordination and creativity.

That’s from the 2017 book “The Creative Spark: How Imagination Made Humans Exceptional” written by anthropologist Agustín Fuentes.

I enjoyed his curation of academic research into an approachable narrative. Below I share my notes for future reference.

Power and Progress

Technology has a way of dazzling us into the deterministic fallacy: assuming path dependence for the ways a technology develops and its impact on society. But we have agency.

The so-called “productivity bandwagon” that we assume follows a new technology (where Schumpeter’s creative destruction will generate more jobs than are destroyed) is not inevitable. Widespread gains require that a technology creates more demand for workers (by creating new tasks and industries), and that demand induces higher wages. Neither are certainties, and take societal negotiation between labor and capital.

That’s from a 2023 book co-authored by economists Simon Johnson and Daron Acemoglu called “Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity.”

The book is big and thorough, with a sprawling historical comparisons over a millennia. Yet, I was disappointed by how few concrete examples the authors gave for what precisely they want to be done differently — especially in a book that is more than 500 pages. For example, on page 353, they write “digital technologies, which are almost by their nature highly general purpose, could’ve been used to further machine usefulness – for example, by creating new worker tasks or new platforms that multiplied human capabilities.” But that “for example” is not actually an example, but rather a reassertion of the general outcomes they seek (“new worker tasks or new platforms.”) Instead, I wanted an example of what exactly could have been done differently to ensure new worker tasks or platforms.

In that way, I found so big a book disappointing, and felt it could have been half as long. I appreciated their overall point, though, of idealizing “machine usefulness” in four ways: machines should improve worker productivity; create new tasks; distribute accurate information (like the web) and give better access and markets. Just don’t look to this book for the path to get there.

As they write: “How technology is used is always intertwined with the vision and interests of those who hold power.” Below I share my notes from the book for future reference.