Our group of Temple volunteers and some of community leaders with whom we worked

By Christopher Wink | January 28, 2005

On a recent trip to poverty ravaged Tijuana, I could not help but see the irony, clichéd as it may be, of a border wall – that divides with great tumult the U.S. and Mexico – extending into the serenity of the Pacific Ocean. It is unreal to brace oneself against the rusted wall and watch it snake its way into the greens and blues of the water below as it divides San Diego and Tijuana. Here, lines drawn on maps are far from imaginary and they carry emotional meaning that no fence should.

But for me, when I travel, the first things I notice are the similarities between where I am and where I live. Mysterious or not, the smiles of children are the same in Mexico: where south not only describes its geographic relationship to the U.S. but also its location below the poverty line. Of course American business spills over the fortified walls, so the border region oozes the products of Sam Walton and Ronald McDonald with a Mexican touch.

Otherwise though, the two sides could hardly be more different. The smiles of youth, globally recognized, are eclipsed by the speed with which Mexican children are forced to mature. Repeatedly I was asked if I were married: an idea, as a nineteen year old American boy, that had not yet occurred to me. But there in Tijuana, resting with other volunteers who were helping to build a school for kids with special needs, I stood a man without a wife. A few miles north and I was back to being a boy without a care.

It didn’t take long for me to realize that the exchange rate is not in pesos or dollars, it is in decades. Time has a different meaning in Tijuana. Ages don’t translate. Twenty-three year old women with more horrors in their pasts than the American troops we support and more violence in their presents than the urban teens we neglect are forgettable there. Married fifteen year olds and buried infants are part of a generational pancake, where diversity of age is as nonexistent as paved roads. The cavernous potential of Mexican youth is too often eroded through bitter time and darkening age.

And so crossing the border becomes a way of life: a fundamental part of Mexican culture. For many, Tijuana, where a gallon of milk costs the same as in the U.S. but wages don’t correspond, is a stopping point before moving on to the riches and splendor of an American minimum wage. Some say that migrants are criminals, but it is hard to imagine doing anything less for your family than risking your life. It is hard to lean against that fence dividing work and poverty, success and failure, life and death, and imagine fathers and sons, mothers and daughters watching their families die without risking a trip across the border.

Standing in the way of the hopes and dreams of millions of Mexican migrants, however, are walls of steel, armies of border agents, and the most dangerous predator of all: the mountains and deserts that line the border east of Tijuana.

Since 1994’s Operation Gatekeeper instituted hugely increased protection of the border, the mountainous and desert regions offer the only possibility to cross for Mexicans without the money for the documents to cross legally. Physical boundaries will not stop men and women from trying to save their families; they will instead ensure that many will die with unimaginable pain.

It is not rational to support open borders, but it is altogether impossible to live and breathe in Tijuana and not recognize that American enforcement of the border has become savagely murderous and insufferably unjust.

I write this on the plane ride home after watching a patient father with bags under his eyes walking the aisle with his recently pacified daughter. It seemed to me that in Tijuana even the most devoted parent rarely had the strength, if blessed with the time, to coddle his child. So the crying doesn’t stop and the closest thing to being pacified is in the reach of the nearest ocean. The fences may muffle the sound, but as the death totals climb well over three thousand, the cries cannot be ignored forever.

As prepared after spending a week working with community groups and living in a migrant workers’ home in Tijuana, Mexico.

Introduction | Motivations | Costs and Benefits | What Failed | Conclusion | Works Cited

The 1940s were largely defined by its violence: Nazi Germany laying siege on much of Europe and the apex of Japanese imperialism in much of Asia. It was this partnership in global expansionism that defined the worst of the world in the twentieth century. It is in this way that it becomes valuable to better understand their tenuous alliance.  Therefore, this paper will discuss why Germany and Japan aligned themselves during the Second World War, and what the pact did and what the pact did not accomplish.

On September 27, 1940, Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, whom U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull had come to distrust, affirmed Hull’s aversion by orchestrating a pact aligning Japan with fellow fascist states Germany and Italy: the famed Tripartite Pact. While, late September of 1940 was unquestionably important in once again aiming to unite these states, the foundation for the Tripartite Pact was decided some four years prior, with the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

Consequently, in this paper, first, I will report on the motivations for the alliance, including previous German/Japanese diplomacy, what prompted Matsuoka to agree to the pact and what the Germans intended to gain. Secondly I will discuss the meager benefits and sizable costs the Tripartite Pact offered its two primary benefactors, Japan and Germany. Finally, I will investigate what the pact failed to accomplish as its efficacy waned.

MOTIVATIONS

In 1936, the geographically disparate pair of Japan and Germany had a common aversion to the Soviet Union and the growing power of its global communist community. To form a bloc of communist-opposing states, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan formed an alliance, signing the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936. The pact, which united Japan and Germany, and Italy a year later, in the struggle against communism, stipulated that if one party went to war with the Soviet Union the others would remain neutral (Gordon 207, 2002). This formation was clearly a decisive step towards Japanese siding with the Axis powers during Second World War (Hasegawa 13, 2005).

In 1938, the United States began moving towards intervention in the second Sino-Japanese War. When Hitler withdrew Germany’s traditional support of China in order to recognize the Japanese quasi colony in Manchuria, the line of opposition for the coming war was becoming increasingly clear (Hasegawa 13, 2005). However, the Soviets were the primary reason in the divide between the Axis powers.

Near the turn of the decade, with the possibility of a German invasion looming, Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin pursued Japanese neutrality to avoid a double-faceted war. However, despite Germany’s breach of the Anti-Comintern Pact with the 1938 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression treaty, the Japanese hesitated with the Soviet proposal. First, Tokyo accepted the terms of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Declaring it “a military alliance directed against the United States,” Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka saw this as a way to unite the Soviets and his new Tripartite partners in a collective and sizeable opposition to the political domination of Western democracies (Hasegawa 13, 2005).

Matsuoka had experienced American racism as a young immigrant on the American West Coast, and so his detection of fading Soviet meaning in the Western world motivated his decision to convince Stalin to join in the defeat of the Allied powers. Indeed, before the German invasion of Soviet territory in June 1941, because the Soviets had neutrality pacts with both the Germans and the Japanese, coupled with the Tripartite Pact, there was a brief time when Matsuoka’s dream of a Japanese, German and Soviet bloc united against the West seemed to becoming to fruition (Koshiro 422, 2004). It is in this way that it is clear that the Soviet Union, without ever joining the alliance, became the most important player in the Tripartite Pact (Hasegawa 14, 2005).

Perhaps Matsuoka should have known a sustained relationship between the Germans, Soviets and his own Japanese was improbable, as even the bilateral treaties that grouped the three were tenuous at best. The Soviets were a target for German military force for more than just ideology. The Soviet Union didn’t officially enter the war until after German’s capitulation but had faced the brunt of German military action throughout. With the French surrender to Germany in June 1940 came a sudden annexation of the Balkans by the Soviet Union. Germany was too involved elsewhere to immediately act on the Soviet move, but the Balkans were a large supplier of oil and grain to the German force (Presseisen 1960). Friendship wasn’t likely.

Still, in simplest means of explanation, all of these cooperatives and alliances were an attempt to rival the status power of Western Europe and the United States. With their “territorial concessions” in China, Germany and Italy were an active part of the imperialist Europe after which Japan had modeled itself. It was through this imperialistic stance that Japanese leaders hoped to find a new place in the global community. For their 1895 victory in the first Sino-Japanese War, Japan was awarded the Liadong peninsula, the Pescadores and the Taiwan islands, as declared by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Their pursuit of international expansion blossomed still. As author Jonathan Lewis wrote, “Japan came late to the game of empires” and tried to make up for their lost time (Lewis 36, 2001).

Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War cemented Japanese influence in China’s northeastern province of Manchuria, and in 1910 Japan had annexed Korea. With the Western world consumed in the bloodshed of the First World War, the Japanese government pushed for control over China by issuing the later-weakened 21 Demands in 1915. Just two years later, Japanese troops lingered in Siberia after helping pro-Czarist Russian forces put down the Bolshevik Revolution. Then, in 1931, Japan officially annexed Manchuria, reaching another high in its growth towards 1942, the pinnacle of its imperialism (Gordon 120, 186, 2002).

Dependent on imports and desperate for additional space to accommodate a growing population, the Japanese government was rapidly expanding in an attempt to overcome an economy that, according to historian Andrew Gordon, even before the global depression began in 1929 “had been stumbling for the better part of a decade” (Gordon 143, 2002). Clearly, Japan wanted to expand, and the sovereignty of other states wasn’t a deterrent. This reality was understood by the West, though the world’s established powers were anything but comforted by the rising Asian force. Rather, the West questioned Japan’s trustworthiness. Indeed, as Winston Churchill told his war cabinet on November 25, 1941, “the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning” (Lewis 19, 2001). How prophetic those words proved, even if only for his great ally to the west.

The general aversion towards Japan may be understandable still, as there is no questioning the country’s determination to expand, with or without the support of its neighbors. Indeed, the purpose of the Tripartite Pact cannot be more concisely conveyed than a Japanese perspective from the 1940s. A briefing that was prepared for an Imperial Conference on September 6, 1941 had high hopes. It suggested that “although America’s total defeat is judged utterly impossible,” Japanese victories in Southeast Asia or a German defeat of the British might bring the war to an end. To that goal, the document continued, “by cooperating with Germany and Italy, we will shatter Anglo-American unity, link Asia and Europe,” and, it continued, “Create an invincible military alignment” (Lewis 18, 2001)

Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister, played an instrumental role in the pact. For his part, Matsuoka was eager to join forces with the Germans in an effort to avoid another embarrassing confrontation with the Soviets. Just one year prior to signing the Tripartite Pact, the Japanese were in the midst of a bloody loss to Soviet forces during the Soviet-Japanese Border War of 1939. While the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 was in direct contradiction to the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, Matsuoka recognized Hitler’s intention to keep the Soviets at a safe distance before an attack (Moore 149, 1941). Like Hitler, Matsuoka recognized that pacts were politically, not ideologically, based. In this way, despite the German past of crossing its ties with Japan, Matsuoka felt aligning with another anti-West power was too important.

Nazi Germany would help the Japanese rise to global supremacy, by, it was thought, counteracting the Soviet military might, a might that would return time and time again in the coming years to interrupt Japanese and German unity. It was Matsuoka, with his experience in the United States, who recognized that Germany, the Soviets, and other less notable members of what would be the Axis powers, were not accepted in the established Western world. Determined on the fact that the West would, likewise, never accept Japan’s place as a growing power, Matsuoka hoped to unite in an overthrow of what he saw to be a West-orientated global hegemony. He had long hoped the Soviets would join him in his initiative, and, similarly, fervently accepted the Germans as a necessary component for that movement to take hold and find any success at all (Koshiro 423, 2004).

While the Japanese had adopted a German-style military staff system in 1878, continued an appreciation for its political endeavors, and had a zealous foreign minister eagerly advocating the pact, the German motivation to engage in the alliance might not be as readily discernible (Boyd 1981).

The Germans saw the Japanese as an attractive diversion from their own front, as even the hint of an additional threat in the Pacific, nearly 10,000 miles away from Berlin, would ease pressure on Nazi movement. While, as in common Tripartite Pact fashion, the Japanese released scant information to the Germans, the Nazis were greatly interested in the Washington talks, nervous that the dialogue would lead to the Americans feeling secure enough in the Pacific to focus their attacks on the Germans.

Certainly, Adolf Hitler, Chancellor of Nazi Germany, had no interest in a gross deterioration of American-Japanese relations either, which would likely require the Germans to wage war on U.S. forces in addition to their other European entanglements. However, so long as the Americans were acutely aware of a Japanese threat, the Germans were that much stronger. Indeed, it seems that Hitler was determined to avoid war with the Americans, remaining uncharacteristically patient with the United States. During the Nuremberg War Trials, Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop spoke of Hitler’s “wish before everything to avoid war with the USA for which…there was absolutely no necessity” (Henderson 1993). Hitler felt the Japanese would be helpful in that endeavor. That is, until December 8, 1941.

It has been asserted that the Pearl Harbor attack which plunged Hitler into an undesired war with the Americans was actually a boon to his alliance with the Japanese. Indeed, the sudden bombing was the type of surprise that Hitler himself admired and, as Hitler already presumed the Americans would enter the war in time, the worst result of the attack wasn’t an unexpected one (Shirer 896, 1990). Hitler knew Pearl Harbor was a decisive moment in the war, a sure turning point. At the Nuremberg Trials, Ribbentrop said that Hitler had explained that if the Germans didn’t declare war on the United States and “stand on the side of Japan, the Pact is politically dead” (Henderson 1993). If the Allied powers recognized a legitimate end to the alliance, the German advantage of necessary Allied attention in the Pacific would be shattered.

The pact didn’t actually necessitate the Germans to declare war, as the Japanese, not the Americans, had initiated the conflict, but Hitler recognized the Japanese as an important portion of his strategy, one he was not willing to abandon as early as December 1941. Many historians have said that it appears that Hitler genuinely believed that Germany and Italy were essentially obligated under the terms of the Tripartite Pact to declare war on the United States, though technically not required by law (Henderson 1993). It was clear even then that his declaration of war on the American forces, which came just three days after the Pearl Harbor bombing, may have been a fatal folly for Hitler’s campaign of expansionism.

The Japanese certainly saw Pearl Harbor as a great and confident beginning. Japanese Prime Minister Tojo Hideki was heard offering a scratchy address over radios nationwide on December 8 of 1941. “For 2,600 years since it was founded, our Empire has never known a defeat,” Tojo harangued, “This record alone is enough to produce a conviction in our ability to crush any enemy, no matter how strong” (WWII Museum).

The Japanese Prime Minister’s pride in the Pearl Harbor attack which would surely cause an American entry to the war was, counter intuitively, likewise appreciated by Hitler. Moreover, while an American entry into battle that early wasn’t on Hitler’s wish list, there was no questioning his distaste for the United States (Henderson 1993).

Hitler was sure the Americans were determined to declare war on Germany anyway, so entering into war on his own terms would give the added benefit of strengthening his alliance with the Japanese, who could provide an important diversion for the Americans in the Pacific (Henderson 1993). Despite Hitler’s racist chauvinism, he admired the militaristic fervor and nationalist pride of the Japanese. That admiration kept his superior-Aryan ideology from hindering his relations with Japan. The Japanese Ambassador to Berlin for much of the war, Hiroshi Oshima, had unparalleled access to German war plans (Shirer 871, 1990). Hitler’s trust of his Japanese counterparts was not entirely off-base.

Oshima, for example, was known for his fanaticism and employment of Nazi rhetoric. In his famed and celebrated book, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, journalist William Shirer described Oshima as “more Nazi than the Nazis” (Shirer 872, 1990). It was through Oshima that a great deal of the German-Japanese communication that was made flowed.

Just months before the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Ribbentrop told Oshima that, “Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany’s entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuhrer is determined on that point (Henderson 1993). There is no doubting that Oshima, like all he learned of German plans, forwarded this message to Tokyo.

MEAGER BENEFITS AND SIZABLE COSTS

The Germans and the Japanese were clearly confident, however unfounded that confidence would soon seem. While limited coordination was evident, the real success of the Tripartite Pact was its division of the Allied attack. It is in this way that the diffuse cohesion of the Germans and the Japanese became an asset, if only in a defaulted manner. There were, after all, two major fronts to be won in order to overcome the tide of fascism.

Academic Michael Wallace, in his evaluations of global arms races, has said that the Second World War could be seen as having been initiated by at least six smaller conflicts, all involving the Tripartite powers (Diehl 1983). It is easy to understand that dividing the Allied forces was a natural boon to the Axis war effort.

Between 1941 and 1945, the United States sent in excess of $32.5 billion in military aid to its allies, of which close to $14 billion went to the United Kingdom and $9.5 billion went to the Soviet Union (Milward 71, 1979). The American military buildup in the war years was astounding. From 1940, when defense spending was under 2 percent of the American gross domestic product, to 1945, when the total came closer to 40 percent, the United States military saw its budget balloon to nearly $65 billion (Williamson 2006).

These funds were forced to be divided between Europe and the Pacific. There is little questioning that that would help the Axis effort, and there should be even less questioning that neither Germany nor Japan could ever even imagine overcoming such economic disparities on their own. Indeed, even using the recession year of 1938 for comparison, the U.S. national income of $67.4 billion was still almost double that of Germany, Italy and Japan combined (Zeiler 6, 2004). At the very least, having two different opponents on two different continents, thousands of miles apart, would surely lessen the American effect on either one region, aiding the goals of both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.

Beyond nominal geographical divides, the two countries did engage in intelligence-sharing, as well. On February 18, 1942, a German naval attaché reported to Berlin that the Japanese military had spoken of a joint German-Japanese push to secure Madagascar. The following day the Germans gave the Japanese all their intelligence on landing sites of Ceylon, the island nation now known as Sri Lanka, which could be used strategically in the mission (Willmott 11, 2002). A success, perhaps, but its minimal importance is telling for the covetous information-hoarding that hampered the weak pact.

Moreover, Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, personally shared almost every piece of German military stratagem with his native Japan. On June 22, 1941, Matsuoka received a cable from Berlin warning that hostilities between the Germans and the Soviets had begun (McKechney 74, 1963). Oddly, it is just such intelligence sharing that, while doubling as a minor success of the pact, begins the long list of its failures, as a great deal of that communication was intercepted and went a long way to ameliorating the Allied war effort.

In 1940 the Americans broke the PURPLE code used by Oshima, who regularly radioed to Tokyo vital German war plans (McKechney 87, 1963). Therefore, whenever there was intelligence sharing between the Germans and the Japanese, that potential benefit for the alliance clearly became a failure.

Still, the level of that communication was, at times, in startlingly short supply. While, because the Americans were listening, scant information-sharing might appear to be a benefit, weak communication was a clear sign of a weak alliance.  The Japanese foreign minister was in Berlin just weeks before the Germans would first attack the Soviets, but not a word of the mission was mentioned. The Japanese, perhaps answering back, never told the Germans of their plans to bomb Pearl Harbor. Of course, this discordance didn’t breach their alliance, it merely hastened its failure, or so it seems.

The Nazis had broken the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 with their non-aggression agreement with Moscow, so legal treachery wasn’t new in German/Japanese relations. Ribbentrop later said at the Nuremberg Trials that, “My experience has taught me that the Japanese are very close-mouthed. We never knew exactly where we stood, never. They never said really what was going on” (Henderson 1993). In that vein, in April of 1941, eager to secure its northern back as Japan moved south, Matsuoka concluded a neutrality pact with the Soviets, without any prior notice to the Germans (Henderson 1993). These spiteful breaches of intelligence sharing were just the beginning of the Tripartite Pact’s failures.

Still, all of the pact’s failures, it seems, can be traced back to the Soviet Union. The Soviets were, without question, a rock on which the Tripartite Alliance was broken. For, as we know, Matsuoka’s plans to add the Soviets to his dream of Western-rivalry were dashed on June 22, 1941, when Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The Japanese government was shaken, left to consider moving north to fight the Soviets in support of their German allies or instead move south towards American territory (Hasegawa 16, 2005).

Just two months after committing Japan to a Neutrality Pact with the Soviets, Matsuoka recommended an immediate Japanese invasion of the U.S.S.R. Japanese troop levels in Manchuria soared, nearly doubling from 400,000 to 700,000 in July of 1941, and Matsuoka pointedly told a Soviet ambassador that Japan’s Tripartite Pact took precedence over its neutrality pact with the Soviets. However, this admission was too strongly worded for Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe who swiftly dismissed Matsuoka (Hasegawa 17, 2005).

His words had already divided the two states irreparably, damaging a peace that was too tenuous to sustain much damage. With Matsuoka and his support of the German war effort, in wanting to attack Soviet territory, gone, Japanese troops began a push into Southeast Asia, home to ample natural resources, a healthy energy supply, and an ornery Allied faction, strengthened by American forces (Lewis 18, 2001). As Japan’s provocation of the United States accelerated, making military engagement all but inevitable, and the Germans continued to press the western front of Soviet territory, the possibility of military action between the Japanese and the Soviets, each busy elsewhere, became increasingly more remote, creating a “strange neutrality” (Hasegawa 19, 2005).

Still, the Soviets exploited the shaky alliance between Japan and Germany to bolster its own military advantage and security.  Under the guise of a German journalist in Tokyo, the Soviets had their greatest asset in Richard Sorge, considered one of history’s most successful spies. He forewarned the Soviets when the Germans were moving on to Moscow in 1941, and, having learned that the Japanese would choose to seize control of Southeast Asia instead of invading the Soviet Union, gave Stalin the opportunity to relocate thousands of troops from Siberia to the capital to protect that German invasion (Boser 2003).

It is this way that many argue that the Soviet entrance into the war had a greater effect on hastening Japan’s surrender than did American President Harry Truman’s decision to make the first nuclear attack in the world’s history. Indeed, the Japanese military leadership was less concerned with the nuclear capabilities of the U.S. army. This was cold, but perhaps calculated, as over 900,000 Japanese died in the Allied fire bombings of the country’s major cities, while fewer than 200,000 Japanese died directly from the atom bombs that landed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Hasegawa 2005). The Soviets, once coveted for collaboration by Matsuoka, had become the greatest catalyst for failure of the Axis powers.

Another troubling breakdown was that the German and Japanese military efforts were never cohesively streamlined. While two fronts persisted, forcing a split of Allied forces – particularly the Americans – without a consistent, coordinated effort between the Germans and the Japanese, their power remained small. Their separation was not only understood by the engaged parties, but even the Allied powers recognized their divide.

While Japanese and German signatories had signed next to each other, to the Allies, in many ways they were seen as a divided enemy, not one war against a single, widespread opponent. Despite being directly attacked by the Japanese, the United States entered the war with a clear “Germany-first” strategy, yet for the first five months of American-involved conflict, nearly all of U.S. commitments were made to the Pacific (Willmott 24, 2002). The Americans were waging two wars.

The Allied forces were more concerned with shuffling their troops and managing two theaters of battle than they were with real collusion between the fascist states. The United States was gravely fearful that in May of 1942 any increased deployment to the south Pacific would undermine their “Germany-first” policy (Willmott 28, 2002). There was a real sense that changing troop levels was less a sign of changing locations of a war, but more of changing power of two different wars.

The separation wasn’t limited to the minds of American leaders either. On December 8, 1941, the day after the Imperial bombing of Pearl Harbor, Japan seemed to be an afterthought to everyone except Americans. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill saw the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor as nothing short of a blessing. Churchill knew that after the attack the United States could no longer remain neutral, which meant their support of his beleaguered nation. In his memoirs Churchill wrote of the Pearl Harbor bombing, “so we had won after all” (Lewis 90, 2001)

WHAT THE PACT FAILED TO ACCOMPLISH

Seemingly, all the alliance managed to do was to unite the Germans and Japanese as an enemy. They were not, by contrast, the common enemy, showing how clear the lack of Tripartite unity was. It is readily accepted among contemporary historians that to most Allied troops, the Japanese were loathed in a way that German forces were not. This was particularly, and perhaps understandably, so among American forces. One study that was conducted on a U.S. infantry regiment in training revealed just that. When asked, ‘How would you feel about killing a German solider?’ just seven percent answered with, ‘I would really like to,’ from a list of choices. When ‘German’ was replaced with ‘Japanese’ that response jumped to 44 percent (Lewis 144, 2001). Racial divides between the German and the Japanese became another reason for the Allies to see the Tripartite powers as anything but united.

Race wasn’t a divide among the Germany and Japan that only the Allies recognized, instead it was another example of Tripartite weakness. In April of 1941, after the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed, Stalin embraced Matsuoka in celebration of their common Asian roots. In an ironic twist, the evaluation of Russians as “Asiatics” was regularly added to anti-Soviet propaganda by Nazi Germany (Koshiro 422-23, 2004). Indeed, there is no questioning that, while Hitler appreciated Japanese fanaticism, with his regime’s promoting the idea of Asian-inferiority, no one could expect Germany and Japan to ever fully cooperate. As far back as the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, German publications demonized the Asian side of the-soon-to-become-Soviet Union. In January, the German-language journal Vorwarts proclaimed that, “the yellow Asians will deliver the vanquished [white Russians] from their Asiatic spirit and lead them back to Europe” (Paddock 358, 1998).

Be it racially-orientated, geographically or socially-based, as the Allied powers saw the German and Japanese as divided, the Japanese and Germans also perceived their alliance as fragilely uniting. The Tripartite Pact was, at its root, simply a pact based on a perceived common interest, not a long-term relationship, so, as the two powers so often acted in their own interest, the Tripartite was ultimately weak.

In April of 1941, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed, uniting two states not out of a common interest (1905’s Russo-Japanese War and the even more recent Soviet-Japanese Border War of 1939 can attest to that), but rather, a common disinterest (Hasegawa 2005). That is, the Soviets wanted to focus on their western border, preparing for a German invasion, and the Japanese were worried about a Soviet attack from the north, while they pursued a campaign through Southeast Asia. The Neutrality Pact was concluded because both parties were unwilling to engage the other militarily at that time.

Germany had done similarly in 1939. There is no doubting that Germany and Japan were trying to survive their own aggrandizement and didn’t necessarily see their own futures tied exclusively to the future of the other. Their underlying racial tensions, meager intelligence-sharing and nonexistent military collusion all suggest just that.

The lack of collaboration is particularly clear in that nonexistent military cooperation. With their military thumping in the Border War of 1939 fresh in their collective memory and recognizing a world of resources around their Asian neighborhood, the Japanese never followed Matsuoka’s desire to push into the Soviet Union in order to meet German troops. Hitler, too, saw this as the clearest means to effective coordination of their collective might, but, as an ardent supporter of the superiority of the Aryan race, he wasn’t about to beg the Japanese to do anything.

Despite his signing the Russo-Japanese non-aggression treaty in April 1941 because of Japan’s recent embarrassment by the Soviet military, Matsuoka changed his stance after Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. Hitler’s proposition to Matsuoka that Japan take part in the attack as well led Matsuoka to become a enthusiastic supporter of the idea of a Japanese attack on Soviet land (Henderson 1993).

However, most of the Japanese leadership was unconvinced, not able to forget the Soviet military superiority in 1939, so southward they went. While his closest advisors felt that a Japanese attack on the far eastern edge of Soviet territory would go far to tumble the tumbling bear, Hitler had decided by the autumn of 1941 to stop pressuring Tokyo for assistance as it would be a clear sign of weakness (Henderson 1993).

Just two months after the German-Soviet neutrality pact was signed, German forces secretly invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941. Despite the German-Japanese alliance, Japanese forces decided to stay removed from the so-called Operation Barbossa. This surely helped the eventual German failure in this preamble to the Second World War’s bloody Eastern front, as the Soviets could devote more of their forces to its western borders, ignoring Japan because of the non-aggression pact between the two Asian states.
Some Japanese officials saw their Soviet neighbors as a valuable resource to hasten the defeat of the Allied powers, even after the Soviets notified Japanese leaders in 1945 that they would not be renewing their treaty. Unbeknownst to the Japanese, at the Yalta Conference earlier that year, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had agreed to enter the war after German surrender.

On the day following the bombing of Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces, the Roosevelt administration requested that the Soviet Union join the war against Japan. New Soviet ambassador Maksim Litinov was instructed to decline, citing the Soviet Union’s devotion to the war with Germany and the neutrality pact in which the Soviet Union was with Japan. Still, just ten days after the rejection, Stalin told British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that the Soviets would join the war against Japan in time (Hasegawa 19, 2005).

In October 1943, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull reported that Stalin had told him that, “when the Allies succeeded in defeating Germany, the Soviet Union would then join in defeating Japan” (Hasegawa 23, 2005). There was no sense of German and Japanese cohesion among the Allied or even Axis powers. Rather, it was readily understood that there was unrest between Japan and Germany, and that the Soviet Union was far less sympathetic to the Axis than Matsuoka would have liked to think.

In 1941 Matsuoka had warned that Japan was devoted to the Tripartite Pact first and the neutrality pact with the Soviets second. Four years later, the Soviet Union reneged on the neutrality pact, citing – inaccurately – that it had been coerced into joining the Allied forces (Hasegawa 191, 2005). While, in actuality, Stalin had foretold an eventual Soviet entry on the Allied side of the war as early as 1941, Stalin told his Japanese counterparts otherwise, allowing the treachery to continue. The Germans and the Japanese were divided again, this time in their defeat.

Without question, the Soviet Union was incalculably important to the timidity of the Tripartite Pact, which never reached its full capacity as Germany and Japan were separated by much more than the 15,500 kilometer expanse along the southern Soviet border. Indeed, in September of 1944, the Japanese military brain trust was willing to throw out the Tripartite Pact to keep the Soviet Union out of the war (Hasegawa 29, 2005).

In November of 1943, Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Natotake Sato, asked if the Moscow Conference, which included the United Kingdom and the United States was a sign of changing Soviet policy towards the Allied Powers. Sato was met with a question of the meaning behind the reaffirmation of the Tripartite Pact just two months prior (Hasegawa 24, 2005). Without an appeasing answer for the Soviets, Sato couldn’t expect one for Japan. The U.S.S.R. remained a balancing point for the Tripartite Pact.

Matsuoka was asked once, while living in semi-retirement, if the neutrality pact with the Soviets was a mistake. Matsuoka called the pact only a means to maintaining Japanese territory, labeling Stalin as untrustworthy (Koshiro 425, 2004). He always knew it would be impossible for a rise in the world with the Soviet Union suppressing Japan in the region. As Matsuoka said, his primary responsibility was to Tokyo, despite his grandiose dreams of a new global order. Moreover, while he felt that the Soviets could have provided an important piece to the Japanese imperialist puzzle, in the end, any attempt Matsuoka made to unite Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan was domestically motivated. In this way, the Tripartite Pact never got off the ground. It was Stalin, one might argue, that kept Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan from ever truly coming together. After all, it was the Soviet issue that continued to divide Germany and Japan, whether it was through troubled treaties or failed military unity.

CONCLUSION

Whatever was the strongest factor in determining failure of the Tripartite Pact is another argument altogether. This paper first reported on the motivations for the alliance, based on the previous relationship between the Japanese and Germans through the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936. Next, this paper elaborated on Matsuoka’s interest in the agreement, a calculated move towards his dream of a new, non-Western-based global political hierarchy, and the German intentions in the pact, to necessitate an Allied presence in the Pacific, diverting them from Japan’s primary campaign of concern.

Secondly, this paper discussed how the Tripartite Pact benefited its two primary benefactors, Japan and Germany, which was relegated to simple intelligence-sharing and de facto division of Allied force. Finally, this paper investigated what the pact failed to accomplish as its efficacy waned in the later years of the war, from its inability to court the Soviets to causing no real military cohesion or widespread intelligence-sharing.
In the end, the Japanese-Germany alliance did extend the reign of terror their fascist movements caused, but, without continued cooperation, it proved ineffectual through the run of the last global conflict of the twentieth century. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan had half a decade of military union, fortunately the pact’s longevity was its greatest accomplishment.

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Text as submitted in fall 2006 to Temple University’s annual undergraduate research forum.

There are nearly 200 member-states in the United Nations; 191 since Switzerland and East Timor joined in 2002 (UN 2005). With such a robust international community, it is clear that some states might require less attention than others. Without enough adequate potable drinking water for its citizens and with an estimated gross domestic product barely in the top 100 among independent states, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, populated by just 23 million people, would seem to be an understandable candidate to slide from global political discourse (CIA 2006). Yet, as heads of state and political scientists from around the world would likely acknowledge, North Korea is anything but forgotten.

In January of 2002, during his first State of the Union address, President George W. Bush famously labeled North Korea as a member of an “axis of evil.” In September of that same year, an American National Security Strategy document released by the Bush administration referred to two “rogue states” that were considered to, “reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.” They were the DPRK and the since invaded and occupied Iraq (McCormack 1-2. 2004).

In recent months, there has been fervor over an alleged North Korean nuclear weapons program, causing a push to return to six-party talks about its termination. The group negotiations, led by the United States, include global powers and North Korean neighbors: China, Russia, and Japan, along with South Korea (Reuters 2006). There is no doubt that North Korea garners a great deal of consideration among politicians and pundits alike. The ready question, then, is if the attention it receives is merited. In short, does North Korea matter?

This paper intends to explore that very question. In the following 3,000 words, this paper will divulge that, despite its small population, easily misplaced size, and seemingly meaningless economy, North Korea is worth close scrutiny and real attention. To do this, first, this paper will focus on North Korea’s location, showing that sharing borders with powerful nations like China and Russia, along with being one troubled half of a divided peninsula, thrust North Korea into relevance. Secondly, this paper will discuss North Korea’s controversial leader, Kim Jong-Il, revealing that his unquestioned control and oft-considered erratic policy have led to his country necessitating attention. Finally, this paper will approach what is most often cited as North Korea’s strongest justification for attention, its military, including its nuclear weapons program. In these three ways, the North Korean state both demands and warrants attention

NORTH KOREA’S LOCATION

First, this paper will show that North Korea’s location clearly gives cause for the state to matter to the world’s powerful political elite. Most notably, North Korea sits in a region of great influence and strategic interest. The DPRK shares nearly 900 miles with the People’s Republic of China, a northern sliver with the Russian Federation, and its peninsula with an American-backed Republic of Korea. Remembering that Tokyo is less than 700 miles east over the Sea of Japan from Pyongyang, North Korea, a country smaller than the U.S. state of Mississippi, remains essentially surrounded by half of the economically commanding and militarily superior Group of 8 nations. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine that any country would think a neighbor didn’t matter, and, as DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il has so many of the world’s most powerful leaders as neighbors, it seems sensible to think, in turn, North Korea matters.

Each of those four closely-nestled states has its own reasons for thinking and ways of showing it thinks North Korea matters and merits concerted scrutiny. There is a hope that the People’s Republic of China can exact influence on North Korea, if they so choose. Indeed, it is fairly common of the West to all but demand that the Chinese government act with that influence to fulfill its promise to quell its noisy, little neighbor (Frum 260, 2003). It might be said that no one hopes that the PRC can positively influence the DPRK more than the PRC itself, having a history of hesitance, but its line against North Korea appears to be hardening.

The Chinese government was entirely unwilling to even discuss sanctions or military action towards the DPRK in 2003 (Cha 124-125, 2003). Yet, at the 2006 meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, held in Hanoi, Vietnam in mid-November, the Chinese government agreed that Pyongyang deserved reproach for its alleged nuclear test the previous month. While Chinese President Hu Jintao implied that he had doubts about APEC efficacy, his country was part of a statement acknowledging concern about the North Korean nuclear weapons program. A week later in Melbourne, the Group of 20 economies, of which the PRC is a part, issued its own strong condemnation of the North Korean program, calling it “deplorable” (Sullivan 2006).

Chinese criticism shows how important the PRC thinks the issue to be as the government is concerned that too much pressure on the DPRK might lead to tens of thousands of refugees pouring into its indigent, northeastern provinces. Annually, hundreds of thousands of North Koreans already risk likely execution by trying to cross into China for a better life. Surely hoping that that life doesn’t involve a nation in which 50 percent of children are considered malnourished, as they are in North Korea, according to a United Nations-European Union survey conducted in 2002 (Breen 2004).

In addition to wanting to stop the flow of refugees, according to some analysts, the PRC also considers North Korea, “a useful buffer against U.S. troops stationed in South Korea,” another reason to view a stable DPRK as valuable (Simons 2006). So worried about North Korean stability, the Chinese government donates at least hundreds of millions of dollars in annual aid to the DPRK (Chang 134, 2006).  While one Chinese official said that, “We have some influence, but we don’t have the kind of relationship where we can tell Kim what to do,” and despite wanting, or perhaps because it wants, a stable North Korea, the PRC scrutiny is tightening (Chang 134, 2006). North Korea certainly matters to the Chinese.

The PRC isn’t the only superpower that is concerned about the DPRK. The Russian Federation has begun fortifying an eight-mile wall along the 12-mile border it shares with North Korea, according to Dong-a Ilbo, a South Korean newspaper (Dong-a Ilbo 2006). Moreover, in addition to partaking in the admonishments by the APEC and G20, the Russian government has made certain to remain united with the PRC in its criticism of the DPRK, according to Interfax, a press agency based in Moscow (Interfax 2006). A troubled neighbor is trouble, indeed, and Moscow’s fortifying and politicking has shown its own interest in the state of North Korea.

Of course, perhaps the most vocal and persistent critic of the DPRK has been the United States. It was the Bush administration that developed the idea for the Proliferation Security Initiative, an agreement between more than 70 nations to share intelligence in an effort to control illicit North Korean activities, particularly its nuclear weapons program (Kirk 2006). After diplomatic progress between the American and North Korean governments in the 1990s, the Bush administration initially diverted its attention from Asia, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Still, the continent remains politically vital, particularly keeping South Korea and Japan aligned closer to the United States than its growing competitor, China (Beal 235, 2005).

The DPRK simply confuses things, as, if it were to reunify with the South, Korea might become too independent to suit the interests of the United States. Indeed, it seems as though any improvement of relations Pyongyang has with any other nation would trouble the Bush administration. Some academics believe that it was the meeting between then-Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Kim Jong-Il in 2002 that returned the American government to the North Korean watch (Beal 235-6, 2005). From the rhetoric of its President to its dogged pursuit of DPRK disarmament, no one questions that the United States thinks North Korea matters.

Despite the 2002 summit, it appears the Japanese view on North Korea has shifted, too, as Tokyo remains staunchly focused on the Kim regime. Han S. Park, a professor of international affairs at the University of Georgia, while lecturing in Seoul after a three-day visit to Pyongyang, said that if North Korea were to reach nuclear maturity then, “Japan, too, would have nuclear weapons” (Yonhap 2006). Meaning that, with interest high, but fear not complete, North Korea’s potential yield from bargaining away its program is at its highest. Park suggested that if the DPRK goes much further in its pursuit of nuclear weapons, the Japanese government would scrap its pacifist constitution and begin a region-wide nuclear arms race in which the DPRK couldn’t compete. (Yonhap 2006).

Moreover, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe [Since replaced, Dec. 5, 2007] is the only leader among North Korea’s Asian neighbors who has welcomed forcefulness in dealing with Pyongyang, a stance he has held throughout his political career (Kirk 2006). Clearly, the enduring mentality that Korea is the dagger at Japan’s underbelly remains, and so in the view of Tokyo, and three other of the world’s superpowers, North Korea does matter.
All that said, the Republic of Korea, smaller than its northern half at just 60,000 square miles large, can’t be forgotten. The Korean peninsula is divided along 150 miles of tenuous instability, the so-labeled Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that runs along the 38th parallel (CIA 2006). Divisions among a people, the Koreans included, are rarely positive or peaceful. Therefore, the very location of North Korea, a divided northern partition of an ancient kingdom, causes a need for attention.

Since the United States and a Chinese-backed, Soviet-armed North Korea made the recently decolonized peninsula the first battleground of communism in the early 1950s, the two Koreas have had more than half a century of aggression and poor relations (Beal 1-13, 2005). While a great deal of violence has been seen before, it might be the potential for more which most frightens international observers, as well as direct actors.

The DPRK military is certainly large, particularly when considering its relative size and the living standards of its population, but there is no questioning that in the game of the peninsula’s arms buildup, South Korea is the clear victor. Since the mid-1980s when the annual military spending of both Koreas was just over $4 billion U.S., the ROK has been employing an arms growth that far exceeds its neighbor above the 38th parallel (Cha 50, 2003).

By the mid-1990s, the ROK was encroaching on $16 billion in annual military spending, almost triple the roughly $5.5 billion of the DPRK (Cha 50, 2003). Even today, despite intermittent cooperation, relations between the two Korean states are hardly normalized, and occasional outbreaks of violence along the DMZ have not ended (French 239, 2004). As it is one of the primary players in a divided people, there is no questioning that North Korea matters, its location necessitates it.

NORTH KOREA’S CONTROVERSIAL LEADER

The most recognizable face of North Korea, its leader Kim Jong-Il, is also another one of the biggest reasons that the state demands attention. While some powers in the region seem to simply find nuclear proliferation distasteful, the American government has a recent history showing that the Bush administration has a genuine aversion for Kim Jong-Il, the man. President Bush has called North Korea “the world’s most dangerous regime,” and referred to Kim Jong-Il as a “pygmy” and likened him to “a spoiled child at a dinner table.” In an interview with Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward, Bush said that he “loathes” Kim (McCormack 2, 2004).

It might be said that President Bush has been wrong many times and that his ideological pursuits have veered from the stable pragmatism of preceding administrations, but, whether Kim Jong-Il is a rational leader or not, there is mounting evidence that Bush’s derision for North Korea’s ‘Dear Leader’ is well-founded.

In 1998, amid the mass starvation of his people, the seditious reproach of his army, and the crumbling failure of his economy, Kim began encouraging the public execution of senior officials from his Socialist government’s industries, after eliciting forced admissions of guilt for various violations of party discipline. Desperate to hold onto power in the nascence of his national leadership, Kim instituted military parades and martial law, while rewarding the loyal with food and punishing the disloyal with death (Becker 190-1, 2005).

With thousands of North Koreans defecting into China, presumably to flee from Kim’s purposeful starving of his eastern provinces, a perpetual nationwide famine, and the failure of the “workers’ paradise” to provide even the most basic material support, it appears that Kim Jong-Il, while still in the fears of North Koreans, is no longer in their hearts (Breen 151-2, 2004). If only for the apparent mistreatment of his people, Kim Jong-Il has warranted international attention.

For leading an apparent hermit state, Kim allows – indeed, needs – a great deal of international intervention, and the attention that comes with it. The World Food Program started with 21,000 tons of food for 500,000 North Koreans in 1995, ballooned to feeding eight million, or nearly half the population, in 1998, and by 2004, it was struggling, amid wavering support for the cause, to feed over three million. Some estimates suggest that more than 3.1 million North Koreans may have died of starvation since the beginning of Kim Jong-Il’s regime (Becker 209-11, 2005). In his own exacerbation of the problem, Kim’s strict regulation of private gardens and personal crops went a long way to make his people even more susceptible to hunger (Becker 32, 2005)

So, international organizations continually try to squeeze into Kim’s home as he reluctantly, hesitantly, slowly opens the door. The United Nations Development Program has sponsored the construction of an industrial-zoned port, sealed off from the rest of North Korea by orders of Kim, in the Tumen River delta, where it feeds the Sea of Japan (Chang 67-8, 2006). The hope is that it will bring in greater revenue for the state, perhaps even for some individuals. While more North Koreans are eating and – relatively - more money is being made, Kim has hardly embraced anyone.

Some might think it fitting if Kim were to be removed from his autocratic control, if only to relieve the North Korean people of his seeming oppression, but, if any forced foreign relief is to come, it will not likely be motivated solely by the benevolence of other states (Breen 174, 2004). In stark opposition to sympathy, Kim is regularly demonized in the Western media – of Kim, the question “Is he insane or simply diabolical” having been posed by a Fox News anchor – and is considered a personal enemy of President Bush (Chang 18, 2006). Kim is also a favorite candidate for venomous scorn from Western political figures, particularly American pundits. In a 2003 article, conservative, American political commentator Pat Buchanan criticized the Clinton and the Bush administrations for offering Kim Jong-Il a “fruit basket” rather than a “tomahawk missile” (Cha 4, 2003).

Hatred for Kim may exist within his own state. Many refugees that escaped from North Korea have suggested that Kim has survived numerous assassination attempts designed by factions within his government. The years of 1998, 2001, 2002 and 2004 may have all included efforts to murder Kim (Becker 145, 2005). The man that is, and has been, central to DPRK identity for much of the world, is an enormous reason that North Korea receives international attention and deserves it all, if only on ignoble grounds.

AN ARMED NORTH KOREAN STATE

All that attention, particularly that which is directed towards Kim, has likely helped give rise to the North Korean military, which, despite the country’s small size, is perhaps the most cited reason for the DPRK deserving the scrutiny it receives. Today, the DPRK military is not something that other states take lightly, rather, it is seen by some as a very real threat to the region. As one DPRK man who defected to China said, “North Korea is based on military-first politics” (Chang 158, 2006). Indeed, the military is budgeted between 30 and 50 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, easily the largest percentage of any nation in the world, according to CIA statistics (Chang 65, 2006; CIA 2006). The Korean People’s army boasts an estimated 1.2 million active-duty troops, with at least 5 million more in reserve (Change 73, 2006). Many of those in action are deployed along the DMZ, just 30 miles from the South Korean capital of Seoul (McCormack 2, 2004).

While some doubt the North’s ability to launch a conventional invasion, its threat is real. Though some question their technology, the DPRK proudly boasts 3,500 tanks, 2,500 armored vehicles, 10,600 artillery guns, 2,600 multiple rocket launchers, and more than 500 combat aircraft (Cha 78, 2003). While their military may be more of a deterrent than an army ready to forcibly reunite the peninsula, in addition to the previously listed armed-assets, hundreds of Nodong missiles sit poised for action in the hills just beyond the DMZ, a threat which could potentially devastate Seoul or portions of Japan (McCormack 2, 2004).

Perhaps even more menacing is the revelation that the DPRK has been accused of developing chemical and biological weapons programs throughout the 21st Century (CIA 2006). The North has at least 12 chemical weapons factories in operation,  annually producing 4,500 tons of mustard gas, sarin and the like (Becker 261, 2006). Even still, there is no consensus over how threatening the conventional military strength of DPRK should be, but the debate itself gives credence to the need of a North Korean-focus within the international community.

Indeed, despite relying heavily on international aid to feed much of its troubled people since the mid-1990s, the government has continued to maintain and even expand these military capabilities (CIA 2006). Still, the recurring problem of food and energy shortages lessen their military impact, though not entirely diminishing the credibility of the attention North Korea receives for it (Cha 78, 2003).

Even beyond its traditional forces, North Korea has received a decade or more of attention that has risen and fallen over its nuclear weapons program. Beyond what has been announced and secretly gathered, there is a very real dearth in information about, like North Korea the state, its nuclear intentions (Chang 23, 2006). That may be the greatest reason for why scrutiny of the DPRK is so deserved; the unknown is the scariest of all.

There are reports of radiation accidents, including children born with deformities, and the fear of mishandling the technology – ignoring the reality that mistakes have happened everywhere proliferation has – is another one of the larger fears among the established nuclear community (Becker 177, 2005).

It is important to note the reality that it is unlikely that DPRK nuclear weapons are anything but a deterrent. Its size and, while relatively robust, its strength, would almost entirely ensure complete annihilation by the United States if it were to make a nuclear attack on any remotely probable victim, like South Korea, Japan, or even U.S. territory. Rather, its nuclear program is more about survival than random destruction (Cha 58, 2003).

Still, the power that might rest in the hands of a tiny, complicated man is clearly worth attention. Likewise, the nuclear weapons that are declared to be held by seven states – Israel still never having admitted a program – should all be under scrutiny by the international community. Whenever a nation wants to join such an exclusive group, just eight members of nearly 200 independent states, attention is demanded (CNN 2006a).

In the case of North Korea, the need for attention is even higher, as Kim has hinted at his interest in using his nuclear program to increase his ability to negotiate with the United States and other powerful nations. That is a tactic that has, some might say, worked in the past. Fearing just such a reprisal, the IAEA’s Director General Mohamed El Baredei said of North Korea that, “it is vital… that nuclear blackmail does not become a legitimized bargaining chip” (Becker 259, 2005). Similarly, while U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, now the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, told the East Asia Institute in July of 2003 that, “to give in to [Kim Jong-Il’s] extortionist demands would only encourage him, and perhaps more ominously, other would-be tyrants around the world” (Becker 260, 2005).

The thought that, beyond misuse or further proliferation, Pyongyang would use its newly acquired deterrent to force the United States or other powers to act differently than they might if dealing with a country of DPRK’s size and influence under altered circumstances, is impressively troubling. In that way, its nuclear program, despite being, or perhaps because it is, largely unknown is likely the biggest cause for and defense of the attention that North Korea receives.

CONCLUSION

Some academics have said that the danger North Korea poses is overstated. In his 2004 book Target North Korea, academic Gavan McCormack wrote that North Korea, “harbors no aggressive or fanatical threat to the region or the world and that its defiance masks an appeal to normalize relations.” He asserts instead that the Kim regime has acted rationally, facing mounting international pressure (McCormack 3, 2004).  Whether the DPRK is a state to be feared or pitied is a debate worth having; this might explain why it is such a popular one among academics and world leaders alike. For as long as the controversy remains a multifaceted one, the DPRK clearly requires active international attention, even scrutiny, assuring that North Korea, simply said, does matter.

This paper’s purpose was to prove just that, how North Korea is deserving of the interest it receives. In order to do that, first, this paper focused on the location of the DPRK, no more than 400 miles from four of the ten largest economies in the world and one half of a very unhappily divided people. Without question, its place in the middle of four enormously powerful and influential states and as a portion of a separated kingdom, creates and commands attention. Secondly, this paper turned to the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Il. The son of the country’s most revered political force, Kim has presided over countless dissident purges and remained far from conciliatory in, leave aside active in halting, the mass starvation of his people. Remaining malignant and, at times, surprisingly cunning, Kim, too, has worked to raise his country’s profile, while at the same time appearing to be a primary reason for that scrutiny. Finally, this paper discussed perhaps the most researched of reasons for scrutiny of the DPRK: its military. With a disproportionately substantial army, in relation to its size, population and economic standing, and an apparent nuclear weapons program, North Korea, without question, needs to remain a focus of foreign powers. In these three broad ways, there is no questioning that, despite being just one small country in a world of 200, North Korea matters.

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Text as submitted to an undergraduate research forum in Tokyo at Temple University-Japan during the fall of 2006.